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When the COVID-19 pandemic spread over the world, it became apparent that 
it exacerbated existing crises and magnified vulnerabilities. In April 2020, we 
therefore set out with a group of students to follow what happened in 7 
countries: The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Haiti, Zimbabwe, 
Philippines, India, Brazil and Chile. 
In all these countries, COVID-19 became part of intersecting and compounded 
crises. The ongoing research programme at the International Institute of Social 
Studies (ISS) of When Disaster meets Conflict  is about dealing with intersecting 
crises, and became the steppingstone for the analysis of the responses to 
COVID-19. When Disaster meets Conflict – and hence these case studies – has 
been supported by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) 
(Grant number: 453-14-013); Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk 
Onderzoek 
The case-studies have been implemented by students of the countries residing 
at the ISS on the basis of remote interviews and secondary sources. COVID-19 
widely triggered top-down and centralised emergency measures. The research 
set out to uncover what happens when COVID-19 hits fragile, authoritarian 
and/ or conflict-affected settings? It focuses on how affected communities 
perceive of and deal with COVID-19 restrictions, and what initiatives emerge in 
providing local safety nets. 
This working paper reports on the research done in Chile. The authors found 
that the dynamics of the pre-existing conflict in Chile are strongly intertwined 
with the pandemic's responses. For example, the government responses to 
COVID-19 are perceived by many as control measures in relation to social 
protest rather than to the pandemic. On the other hand, collective actions 
resulting from the social movement later served as a platform that facilitated 
collaborative efforts such as "hunger protests" or the development of common 
kitchens that helped with the response to the pandemic 
 
Rodrigo Mena,  
Assistant professor of humanitarian studies  







Table of Contents 
ABSTRACT  5 
1 INTRODUCTION 6 
2 METHODOLOGY 7 
3 FINDINGS 7 
3.1 Country context before COVID-19 7 
3.2 Why the vision of the government and the social movement 
differs? 8 
3.3 Top-down measures in response to COVID-19: “We have one  
of the best health systems in the world” 9 
3.4 Consequences of top-down measures in vulnerable sectors of 
Santiago de Chile 11 
3.5 Local initiatives for national problems: Ollas communes  
(common pots) to face hunger 13 
4 CONCLUSIONS 15 
REFERENCES  16 







COVID-19 broke out in Chile in March 2020, in the midst of an intensive social 
conflict rooted in the deep-seated inequalities caused by the free-market reforms 
in the country implemented since the dictatorship era of Pinochet in the nineties. 
Underlying the protests and demonstrations there was a big discontent from 
several sectors of the population that barely received the benefits of the free-
market economy that once put the country as a leader and example in the Latin 
American region.  
The government seemed to be unaware of the problems that most of 
the population was facing and, as this research showed, the measures 
implemented to stop the spread of the virus also demonstrated the scarce 
knowledge of the livelihood conditions of many. The government’s response to 
the pandemic was to implement dynamic quarantines, to declare a “state of 
emergency” and to set a curfew. The population started to claim that the 
pandemic was the perfect excuse for the government to implement authoritarian 
measures to diminish social conflict.  
As we researched, these measures showed the deep-rooted inequality in 
the country. While a part of the population could keep working and maintaining 
a certain level of life, many lost their jobs (mostly informal) and could not sustain 
their everyday life, starting a new type of demonstration: hunger protests. 
Chileans mobilized again but this time to cover the most vulnerable sectors 
immediate needs, like hunger, by organizing ollas communes (common pots).  
Through a qualitative research approach, our study used secondary data 
analysis (mainly press) mixed with semi-structured interviews. Five key 
informants from the private, social, and public sectors were consulted via the 
Zoom platform. 
After analyzing the data, we concluded the case of Chile shows how pre-
existing conflict dynamics can be strongly intertwined with pandemic responses 
as earlier protests for greater equality paved the way for a climate facilitating 
‘hunger protests’ during the pandemic. However, the path for collective action 
was also paved as in response to growing mistrust in the state, citizens had a 
strong social mobilization base to face needs like hunger. 
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From the Chilean miracle to hunger protests:  
how COVID-19 and social conflict responses relate 
1 Introduction 
For many decades, Chile was considered by the international community a 
developed economy due to the good performance of several macroeconomic 
indicators, which made the country an example for other economies in Latin 
America. The market-led economic Chilean model was acclaimed to be the cause 
behind the country’s prosperity and its robust economy. However, this model 
brought many inequalities among the population as a result of the privatization 
of social security systems and market deregulation (Flores et al 2019; Gallegos 
et al 2018).  
As the claimed prosperity left behind several sectors of the population, in 
2019 the country witnessed the emergence of a growing number of 
demonstrations on the streets, these took place each Friday from October 2019 
until the COVID-19 outbreak in March 2020. The protests started due to the 
increase in the public transport fare but soon summed different demands. The 
precarity of wages, the clear social inequalities, the increase on different public 
service rates, and the gender violence were some of the reasons behind the 
mobilization of hundreds of Chileans.  
These demonstrations became the largest that the country witnessed in the 
last decades. Chileans were demanding social justice to a government that 
seemed not to be aware of inequalities as the harsh repression with which the 
government responded the protests showed. When the social movement became 
wider, president Piñera changed his discourse and, some weeks after he stated 
that the protesters were criminals, he declared: It’s is true that problems have been 
accumulating for decades and the different governments and mine haven’t been able to see this 
situation in all its magnitude” (as quoted in Montes 2019).     
Another example of how the government seemed to ignore the prevalence 
of inequalities was the statement made by the former health minister when he 
mentioned in an interview that: “There is a level of poverty and overcrowding [in Chile] 
of which I was not aware” (El Mostrador 2020) when he referred to the risks of 
COVID-19 infection to which the population of Santiago was exposed.  
The belief that many members of the political class had about Chile, as an 
example of development to be imitated for others, had several implications in 
how the government faced the COVID-19 crisis and how people received and 
perceived the implemented measures. COVID-19 as a disaster of global 
proportions was replied in Chile in light of the social conflict and crisis the 
country was facing. The current social conflict in the country is rooted in a 
“miscommunication” or disconnection between citizens and government. This 
disconnection affected people’s reception of the Chilean government measures 
to control the spread of the coronavirus, while the distrust to the political 
institutions and their perceived inefficiency encouraged local initiatives to face 
immediate problems like hunger. Therefore, the guiding question of this 
research was: How top-down governmental measures in response to the 




2  Methodology 
To answer the research question, analysis of secondary sources (press in 
particular) and semi-structured interviews were carried out. Secondary sources 
included relevant news and articles related to the social movement in Chile and 
the responses from the government to the COVID-19 crisis, particularly from 
October 2019 until August 2020.  
In a second stage, five semi-structured interviews were done with relevant 
actors representing the private, government, and civil society sectors. The 
interviewees included representatives from ACCIÓN Empresas, a network of 
companies committed to sustainable development, Comunidad de Organizaciones 
Solidarias, a network of civil society organizations (CSO), Coordinadora Feminista 
8M, a feminist organization, and a public servant from the Ministry of the Interior 
and Public Security. The interviews were conducted under confidentiality 
agreements, and the statements of the interviewees do not necessarily represent 
the opinion of the organizations in which they work or participate.  
3  Findings 
3.1 Country context before COVID-19 
The COVID-19 pandemic reached Chile in the middle of the largest social 
movement in the country since the end of the Chilean dictatorship in 1990. 
These protests, among others, are rooted in social demands for reducing 
economic inequality and improving the general livelihood conditions of most 
Chileans. These social demands contrast with the idea of a country with a 
prominent economy and high standard of living. 
This positive image of the country is usually backed by the fact the country 
presents a high Human Development Index1 (UNDP 2019), it was the second 
country in Latin America to join the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OCDE) and has free trade agreements with multiple 
countries, like USA, China, Canada, Hong Kong, among others. The “Chilean 
miracle” is the concept that is used intensively in the literature to analyze how a 
Latin American country managed to grow economically for about 10 
consecutive years by 7% on average (Valenzuela 1997; Donald 1997; Ruiz-Tagle 
2010; Bernal- Leon 2011). This imaginary has also been strongly promoted by 
the current government. For instance, on October 9th, 2019, at a press 
conference, the Chilean President Sebastián Piñera pointed out: ‘In the midst of 
this convulsed Latin America we see Chile, our country is a true oasis, with a 
stable democracy’ (Cooperativa 2019).  
Only 9 days after this statement, the country saw the beginning of the largest 
social movement in decades, strongly contesting the benefits of this “miracle”.  
This movement started when the government announced a new increase of 30 
CLP (0,032 EUR approximately) in the price of a subway ticket on October 16th, 
2019. Secondary students started a campaign to not pay the subway, raiding 
 
1 The Human Development Index is a summary measure of average achievement in 
key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable 
and have a decent standard of living. Chile is ranked 43 over 189 countries (being n°1 
in Latin America), which is considered a high level of human development. 
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different stations for three days. Different riots occur followed up all over the 
country.  
Due to their relevance and strength, on October 19th the government 
declared a state of emergency and a curfew, which lasted 10 days. The streets 
were under the control of military forces, but instead of calming the 
demonstrations, their actions were marked by a violent repression of the 
protesters. According to official data from the National Institute of Human 
Rights of Chile (INDH for its acronym in Spanish), more than 20 people were 
reported dead, 245 injured by firearms, and 2686 people detained throughout 
the country, only in those 10 days.  
With this State violence, mobilizations increased and became a transversal 
citizen movement with the tagline "It is not about 30 pesos, it is about 30 years", 
hinting that the mobilization did not respond simply to the rise in the public 
transport ticket, but to the accumulated inequality that is not explained with the 
country’s good economic performance. The mobilizations were massive and 
lasted almost five months, only in the capital city, more than one million people 




Thousands of protesters gathering in Plaza Italia, Santiago de Chile, in October 2019.                
Retrieved from: Miles de chilenos entonan a Víctor Jara en la protesta más grande desde que cayó 
Pinochet (cuartopoder.es), (Rodrigo Sáez, Efe). 
 
3.2 Why the vision of the government and the social 
movement differs? 
Some authors point out that the “stability” of Chilean democracy is not the result 
of a successful institutionalization, but rather the imposition of a repressive state 
that has established order to benefit a privileged minority at the expense of 
individual rights and freedoms (Loveman, 1993; Valdivia 2010 cited in Heiss 
2017: 474). This translates into inequality (social, economic, cultural, and 
political) that contradicts the "model worthy of imitation" that the government 
of Chile promoted. Said economic growth based on emblematic neoliberal 
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policies in the region did not necessarily mean a redistribution of economic gains 
towards the population. If we reviewed the data related to inequality, we can 
conclude that it has increased in the last 30 years (Flores et al 2019), which raises 
a feeling of injustice that has found its vanish point through various social 
movements since 2006 (Heiss, 2017: 476; Freire 2020: 157) reaching its peak 
with the social outbreak of 2019.  
This social outbreak set various precedents. The most clear was the retaking 
of public spaces to protest against different agendas (since the end of the 
dictatorship there were no demonstrations as massive as those that occurred 
from October); the demands were not sectorial as before (education, health, or 
housing), but rather united against inequality and the precariousness of life 
("until dignity becomes customary" was the most common motto to see); and, 
finally, we could witness a  re-emerge of historical strategies of collective 
solidarity in protests, many of which were developed and used during the 
country's dictatorship between 1973 and 1990.  
As soon as the mobilizations began, the president invoked the State Security 
Law, a legal instrument that imposes higher penalties on those who disturb the 
order and put the security of the State at risk. Since the return to democracy after 
the dictatorship (1990), these measures were not used before. The presence of 
the military in the streets and the implementation of a curfew (the first since 
1987), evoked in the public the feeling of having returned to the Pinochet 
dictatorship (Freire 2020: 155). By March 2020, the high levels of repression 
towards the movement resulted in more than 30 casualties, 405 people with eye 
injuries (because of the use of pellet shots to repress protesters), partial curfews 
by the governments, and large violent clashes. This led to a national crisis and 
Piñera's approval in national surveys fell to a record low of 6% (CEP 2020).   
It is in the midst of this social crisis and conflict in Chile that, in early March 
2020, the first cases of the COVID-19 pandemic were announced in the country.  
3.3 Top-down measures in response to COVID-19: “We 
have one of the best health systems in the world” 
When COVID-19 appeared in the country, there was a sense of confidence in 
the health system by the political elite of Chile. Jaime Mañalich, the Minister of 
Health at that time, pointed out that they had one of the best health systems in 
the world and were prepared to face the toughest of the scenarios. The first 
strategies adopted by the government were closing schools and universities 
twelve days after the first case was confirmed, curfews across the country 
between 22:00 and 5:00 hrs and dynamic quarantines.  
Dynamic quarantines consist of quarantining certain areas while others 
continue to operate. It is a strategy that different countries chose to pursue 
“controlled herd immunity”: the largest amount of non-vulnerable population 
(children, youth, and adults without previous health conditions) is infected and 
in their recovery, they generate immunity to the virus, thus protecting the 
populations most at risk. In the case of Chile, dynamic quarantines were applied 
at the municipally level starting with those municipalities that had higher rates 
of contagion and were becoming more flexible as they showed improvements. 
For these measures to be effective, though, there must be two key points: 




According to one study presented to the COVID-19 Social Committee2, 
this model was better than a full lockdown since keeping a constant number of 
infections, could make it easier to contain the virus (Siebert 2020), at the same 
time it allows to keep the country’s economy running, an explicit concern of 
President Piñera (Cerda 2020). This measure, however, was not exempt from 
criticism. Both the Colegio Médico (Chilean Medical Association) and mayors 
from all over the country requested to apply a total lockdown since they saw 
with concern how cases were increasing exponentially, to which the minister 
replied: "What they are saying is absurd, it is a disproportionate measure" (La 
Tercera 2020) 
In mid-April, foreign media analyzed Chile's “successful” plan that stood 
out for its massive tests (Vega 2020) and lethality rates similar to South Korea, 
Germany, or Japan (Paul 2020), therefore, Piñera's approval increased to 21%, 
the highest rate since the social outbreak of October (Mardones 2020). With 
these indicators, the government began to install an idea of a "new normality", 
lifting the confinement of some municipalities (with higher income) and 
announcing a "safe return plan". This strategy implied public officials would 
return to their face-to-face activities (except for those over 70 years and pregnant 
women) and for children to return to school. The minister's strategy was to 
return to essential activities relying on the stock of beds and mechanical 
ventilators that were available in the country. 
However, this concept of "new normality" was again widely criticized both 
by health experts and by the government's political sector, given that they 
occurred in a context that had not yet reached the peak of infections and in 
complete secrecy, without taking into account the recommendations of the 
technical or social committees (Segovia and Leighton 2020; Colegio Médico de 
Chile 2020b). The technical committee insisted on the need to make the 
traceability data of positive cases transparent, therefore isolation and quarantine 
can be more efficient (Colegio Médico de Chile 2020a). In addition to noting 
that these types of announcements gave a feeling of "false end-of-crisis 
environment, undermining the communications efforts of the health authority" 
(Colegio Médico de Chile 2020b). However, Minister Mañalich insisted that this 
was a concept coined by the WHO and was appropriated to use according to 
the great performance that Chile demonstrated. 
This excess of confidence of the minister, as well as the decision-making 
without considering the technical reports of the advisory boards, led the 
government to confront the health unions and mayors (Mella 2020). They later 
claimed a lack of information and coordination on the part of the executive. For 
example, many majors indicated to learn only on the news if their municipalities 
remained quarantined or not. 
However, by mid-May, the capacity of the hospitals in the south-east area 
of Santiago (the most vulnerable population) was at its limit, with 99% 
occupancy. Public health experts pointed out that the dynamic quarantines 
allowed the virus to migrate from less vulnerable to the most vulnerable 
populations, triggering the contagion and mortality, facilitated by social and 
economic factors of these populations (Galarce 2020):  High level of social 
 
2 The government created different “committees” to get advice for different public 
policies against COVID-19 
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overcrowding, low access to health, lower nutritional values, and resistance to 
comply with quarantine since many people live on a daily income. 
In late May, the Emergency Operations Committee, the monitoring agency 
in charge to trace positive cases of COVID-19 and ensure compliance isolation, 
revealed that they were collapsed. Its call-centers in charge of these tasks left up 
to 11,000 calls without a trace, and that was repeated daily given the lack of 
human resources (Sepúlveda & Miranda 2020). With this, Mañalich’s strategy 
failed. Traceability was a very important factor to prevent infection but was not 
considered on time despite constant recommendations of the technical 
committee and other social actors, like majors. Mañalich tardily gave this mission 
to trace cases to the primary health care centers of the country at the municipal 
level (June 3), when almost a month before (April 16) 58 mayors of the capital 
had offered their collaboration to the minister to monitoring and tracking the 
cases, taking advantage of their territorial network, offer that was refused by the 
minister.  
On June 5, Mañalich assumed in a press point that the dynamic quarantines 
in Santiago had failed because mobility (trips between municipalities) did not 
decrease as expected. Mobility should have dropped to 35%, and it had only 
done so to 70% while the mechanisms for traceability that should have covered 
at least 80% of the persons that tested positive, had only managed to trace 60%. 
In the most vulnerable communes, the highest mobility rates were maintained 
close to 90%, in turn registering the highest mortality rate in the metropolitan 
region (Miranda 2020).  
As the everyday diagnoses went from 500 cases per day in April to 2,660 
per day by the beginning of May, the government decided to strengthen the 
lockdown measures. The numbers showed that the pandemic had worsened and 
that the dynamic lockdowns and the strategies followed until then were not 
giving the expected results. The complete lockdown was announced only two 
weeks after the government’s attempt to lead the country to a “new normality”, 
which implied having public employees return to work and reopen schools, and 
which was suggested as the outbreak seemed to be controlled.  
  
3.4 Consequences of top-down measures in vulnerable 
sectors of Santiago de Chile  
In the context of the failure of the first measures, the now-former minister of 
health, stated that “Santiago’s battle is the crucial battle in the war against 
coronavirus” when he announced the complete lockdown for the Santiago 
province and other six municipalities located in the periphery of Santiago. This 
vocabulary using the concepts of battle and war had been used by the 
government before during the social outbreak at the end of 2019. The complete 
lockdown was settled to start at 22:00 of May 15, affecting almost 42% of the 
total population of Chile (EMOL 2020). With this measure, the ghost of the 
curfews returned to people’s memory, and many indicated that these measures 
sought not only to control the virus, but also a new social outbreak in the face 




Despite the awareness of some of the implications of complete quarantines, 
considering that the former minister of health recognized this was not an 
effective strategy as it affected the most vulnerable sectors (Televisión Pública 
Noticias 2020), the government measures to prevent difficulties for this 
population seems to be insufficient. According to a government representative, 
this happened not because of a lack of efficiency and coordination of the public 
sector, but because of the lack of trust in the institutions, and in the government 
in particular: “in this context, anything that we could do seemed like bad or not 
enough for the population. We are always under critics” (Personal interview 
2020)3. Therefore, one of the most overlooked aspects of the actions 
implemented by the government was the impact of these measures, particularly 
in the lower-income neighborhoods, where many families could not acquire 
basic goods as several jobs were lost and the economic situation worsened with 
the pandemic.  
However, the COVID outbreak was just a driving force that worsened 
conditions already occurring in the country and at the base of the social 
movement: poverty and informal economy. According to the last National 
Socioeconomic Characterization Survey, the wealthiest sector of the Chilean 
population obtained 38.1% of the national income while the poorest sector 
obtained only 1.4% in 2017 (Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile 2017). 
Besides, the National Employment Survey that covered the first quarter of 2020, 
showed that the national unemployment rate increased by 0.4% in comparison 
to the previous quarter, reaching a total of 28,9%, with an important number of 
people working in the informal sector (INE 2020).   
In this given context, some of the municipalities of the Gran Santiago, 
particularly those of the urban periphery, received the new measure in difficult 
conditions: people working in the informal economy, the precarity of wages, and 
overcrowded households. Besides, and despite the government announced that 
law enforcement actors would be able to impose high fines to those that violated 
the quarantine, the mobility of many segregated municipalities did not reduce. 
The previous showed a common phenomenon occurring in Latin America: 
while high-income neighborhoods showed a reduction of their mobility with the 
measures, poor communities could not manage it as for the urgency of the daily 
sustenance. In this regard, a study revealed that the total lockdown in the Chilean 
metropolitan area did not impact much in the mobility rates of the poorest 
municipalities as it did in rich ones, mainly due to socioeconomic causes 
(Weintraub et al. 2020) as the high-income areas have greater access to public 
services and formal jobs that could be done remotely.  
The reduced awareness of the government about the vulnerability faced by 
the poorest sectors resulted in protests that followed a call by the government? 
for a complete lockdown. On May 18, residents of El Bosque, a municipality in 
Santiago that was under quarantine since mid-April, took the streets arguing that 
authorities were ignoring the fact that many people had no access to food, water, 
and shelter. As in many other Latin American big cities, in Santiago the periphery 
is a synonym of spatial segregation of poor urban communities. The 
geographical boundaries are also an expression of social and economic exclusion 
so the fact that the protests started in a municipality of the urban periphery was 
 




not a surprise. According to the National Socioeconomic Characterization 
Survey 2015, multidimensional poverty in El Bosque municipality was 27.04%, 
more than the national average of 20,9%, while overcrowding reaches 18% of 
households, while income poverty is the highest in the Metropolitan Region 
(Ministerio de Desarrollo Social y Familia 2015). 
The so-called hunger protests resulted in? the President’s announcement about 
the distribution of 2.5 million food baskets to the most vulnerable families. In 
addition, at the end of April, the government released an economic emergency 
package that included an “Emergency Family Income” intended to reach 4.9 
million workers of the informal economy, consisting of a monthly payment for 
members of the most exposed households that did not have a formal income.  
However, what the protests showed was that the poorest sectors could not 
wait for receiving food supplies, which distribution logistics was poorly 
considered in the assessment of the organizations interviewed. Together with 
the previous, the Emergency Family Income also seemed late in order to 
ameliorate the economic situation.  
The government responded to the hunger protests by deploying security 
forces that confronted the demonstrations with tear gas and water cannons, 
giving signs of the authoritarian nature of Piñera’s government that many human 
rights organizations have reported and became visible with the excessive use of 
force and the policy abuse towards the protesters of the social movement of 
20194. The hunger protests spread to other municipalities nationwide that were 
facing the same problem, however, due to the rules of social distancing, they 
were not very visible and not caught by the media.  
These protests also showed the lack of coordination between local and 
national authorities. The mayor of the El Bosque municipality stated that the 
local authorities distributed around 2,000 aid packages and asked the central 
government “not to continue to burden municipalities with an economic 
responsibility we cannot cover” (Chile Today 2020). While the Association of 
Municipalities disapproved the logistics behind the food basket measure as its 
president stated that from the total households that meet the requirements to 
receive this aid, only 58% would receive it as for the number of boxes available. 
In addition, local authorities were critical to the initiative particularly for the 
delay in the delivery as thousands of households received the boxes at the end 
of June, almost a month after the initiative was launched. This led the 
Association to suggest to the government new measures for the second delivery 
of food baskets (24 horas 2020; El Desconcierto 2020; Radioagricultura 2020) 
3.5 Local initiatives for national problems: Ollas communes 
(common pots) to face hunger 
As stated by one of the interviewees, underlying the protests there was not a 
problem of shortage of food supply, as many media argued, but an economic 
crisis that led to certain sectors to conditions of food insecurity and lack of 
resources to acquire basic goods. As this interviewee argued, what people were 
 
4 Cfr “Informe sobre la Misión a Chile 30 de octubre – 22 de noviembre de 2019”, 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and “Chile. 
Events of 2019”, Human Rights Watch. 
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asking for was for an “economic solution rather than a food solution” (personal 
interview 2020). 5 
According to the survey “How the Metropolitan Region is experiencing the 
quarantine?”, the households from the lowest socioeconomic levels have faced 
a decrease in their income with the measures of confinement and social 
distancing, as 72% of the people from the lowest socioeconomic levels stated 
that their income has decreased a lot, which differs to the 32% of the high-
income group (Ipsos-Espacio Público 2020). 
To face the food situation, which was a consequence of the economic 
scenario that prevailed before the outbreak and that worsen with it, many 
neighborhoods in the country witnessed the resurgence of the Ollas Comunes 
initiative (common pots). As a protester of the municipality Villa San Francisco 
explained “We are not getting the government bonds, we don't have money to 
eat. We, the neighbors that have a little income are organizing ourselves, buying 
merchandise, and donating it, especially for those with COVID-19. But what 
will happen when we run out of money?" (Diario UChile 2020).  
Las ollas communes comprise a positive experience of organization in which 
vulnerable sectors autonomously provide themselves with food for their 
subsistence. For this initiative, women play a strategic role as regularly they are 
the ones who carry out the work of cooking. As stated in an interview by the 
spokeswoman of a Chilean feminist organization, the common pots, and the 
supply and mutual care networks that emerged in popular neighborhoods to face 
the crisis were an expression of the sexual division of labour and were enabled 
by the previous local assemblies (asambleas territoriales) that arose from the 
social movement of October 2019. These local assemblies embody collective 
organization to resist and shape new relationships in the community, outside the 
frameworks provided by the State and the market. These are composed of young 
and elderly people and are characterized by a mistrust towards the existing 
institutions what makes them create mechanisms to solve the most immediate 
problems within the community. According to this interviewee “There are no 
centralized forces that take these initiatives, but rather the articulation of 
initiatives that arose in a dispersed manner after October 18”.  
However, the common pots initiatives are not new. Clarisa Hardy (1986) 
traces the origins of this initiative to unions and strikes scenarios and, particularly 
associates them with workers' layoffs and repression that they suffered after the 
1973 coup d'état that brought Augusto Pinochet to power. These workers’ families 
were left without financial support for political reasons, however, the common 
pots not only attempted to solve the hunger problems of families experiencing 
this situation but also solve problems caused by the economic model 
implemented. 
Therefore, the initiative of the common pots in the Chilean context has a 
strong component of collective memory, which is shaped for those elements in 
history that are still present or related to a collective reality. 
 




4  Conclusions 
The crisis generated by the coronavirus outbreak disaster added more discontent 
to the already harmed political, economic, and social landscape that caused the 
social movement and several protests in Childe during 2019 and the beginning 
of 2020. The social crisis that the country was facing by then made evident the 
existent inequalities in the country which demolished the idea of Latin America’s 
economic miracle, as Chile was considered the most successful free-market 
economy of the region. 
The mismanagement of COVID-19 in the Chilean public arena deepened 
the democratic crisis that the government was facing and that was making 
evident the existent mistrust towards institutions and the distance between 
authorities and the population.  
This scenario made it difficult to face a disaster like a pandemic if we 
consider the spiral of ungovernability concept, explained by Pasquino (2002), and 
which refers to the incapacity of the government to face problems due to the 
lack of credibility from those governed towards its institutions. The lack of 
legitimacy that the government was experiencing affected how the country faced 
the coronavirus, as a proper response implied a crucial presence of the State to 
lead and coordinate response-related actions 
However, it was demonstrated that the government’s reduced awareness 
about the economic and living conditions that prevailed in the low-income 
segment, resulted in this sector not been properly reached by the governmental 
measures, as the hunger protests revealed. In addition, the lack of trust towards 
the government revealed the precarious articulation between the measures 
established and the local initiatives, as their emergence had to do with mistrust 
of the capacities of the government to face the crisis.  
Some of the interviewees from civil society organizations stated that, as 
many countries in the world, the Chilean government was not prepared to 
effectively face a pandemic. As a result, the government of Chile resorted to 
measures like the Emergency Family Income or the food baskets, as they 
intended to provide basic goods to the more vulnerable sectors in an immediate 
way. However, these measures, named as assistance-based by the interviewee, 
were not able to tackle the more profound social and political causes of the social 
crisis and the COVID-19 disaster. 
However, the findings revealed that aid did not arrive due to the lack of a 
proper strategy to distribute these resources, nor did it have the expected 
outcomes. The measures of the government seem not to have properly 
considered the previous economic conditions that many communities were 
already facing, which not only were evident during the outbreak but also during 
the previous protests in the country.  
As in different episodes of Chilean history, where the more vulnerable are 
affected by political and social crisis and disasters ―like the dictatorship, 
earthquakes, or the current pandemic―, local initiatives arise as an expression of 
the lack of trust towards the government.  They arise in contexts where it is 
thought that the only alternative to get the basics for survival is through local 
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